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Globalization, Financial Development and Regional Economic Dynamics: asymmetric panel 
evidence from Africa.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines how regionalization in the face of globalization has affected financial 
development in the context of banking system efficiency in Africa. Results which  are robust to 
financial system efficiency and growth-led-finance nexus  reveal that in the post-regionalization 
era: (1) UEMOA and CEMAC regional banks’ ability to finance credit by deposits has reduced; 
(2) financial institutions of COMESA have improved their capacity to fund openness related 
activities/projects with  deposits; (3) increase in welfare has positively affected the intermediary 
role of banks; (4) globalization tends to be more detrimental to financial systems of ‘economic and 
monetary’ regions than to those of purely economic regions. As a policy implication, national and 
regional authorities should gain knowledge of the fact that with openness, the role of domestic and 
regional banks seems to lessen in the funding of openness related activities and projects. Much 
needs to be done on the improvement of infrastructure that curtails information asymmetry in the 
banking industry. 
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1. Motivation  
 
 Benefits of globalization to developing countries are still subject to debate.  Some export 
driven economies like China have witnessed double digit GDP growth rates over the last decade 
thanks to their integrating the World Trade Organization at the turn of the last century. Though 
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there is more consensus on the positive welfare effects of openness (Spatareanu and Manole, 
2010; Welch and Romain, 2008), some authors still caution the need to progressively lift trade 
barriers only in tandem with economic development (Dornbusch, 1992). Openness is seen by 
many as a means of improving efficiency through allocation of savings into profitable and 
productive projects. The World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been 
forerunners of this thesis; propagating and spreading the message to indebted poor and developing 
countries even at the expense of autonomous national economic policies. They stress that 
openness exposes countries to more advanced new ideas and methods of production; there-by 
increasing international competition and enhancing efficiency. As a consequence in the mid 
1980s, under the pressure of mounting debt servicing African countries were obliged by the IMF 
and WB to adopt structural adjustment policies that encouraged trade liberalization, privatization 
and progressive meandering towards market-focused economies. In effect, these countries began 
clubbing into economic and monetary units in an attempt to facilitate openness and accelerated 
regionalization. Two decades on, the need to take stock of the effects of these policies on regional 
development is pressing. Capital and trade account openness (globalization) are seen by many an 
author not only as a source of growth, but also as a means to financial development (Baltagi et al., 
2009; Hanh, 2010). Owing to abundant literature on the openness-growth nexus and the 
imperative of financial development in the continent, the goal of this paper is to appreciate how 
globalization has affected the allocation efficiency of African banks. In plainer terms, we shall 
seek to investigate how regionalization has improved the ability of banks to transform mobilized 
funds into credit destined to economic operators1. Results could be interesting to national and 
regional policy makers in defining the role domestic and regional banks play in financing 
                         
1
 Suffice to note, one of the goals of regionalization with respect to the IMF and the WB was to improve allocation 
efficiency, so as to reduce foreign reliance on debt in a distant future.  Decades on, evaluating the impact of 
regionalization on the ability of the financial system to fund credits is imperative.  
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openness oriented activities in the face of globalization. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: we thoroughly review related literature in section 2; section 3 describes data and outlines 
our methodology; we present empirical results in section 4 before concluding with section 5.   
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Literature on openness-finance nexus 
  
 There is abundant openness-finance literature. While some authors are explicit enough to 
distinguish between capital account and trade account openness, others simply combine both 
concepts. Rajan and Zingales (2003) have professed that developing countries (especially closed 
economies) would most likely benefit from financial development only through the interaction of 
trade and financial openness. Plainly put, they imply developing countries would less likely 
benefit from financial development if capital and trade accounts are not opened simultaneously. 
However in much recent literature Baltagi et al. (2009) and Hahn (2010) have independently 
partially rejected the hypothesis through studies focused on a broad range of developing countries. 
It follows that, though simultaneously opening of the financial and foreign-trade sectors could be 
more beneficial to the economy, trade and financial openness are independent significant 
determinants of financial development. An important question we could be poised to ask is to 
know if the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis could be validated in African economic region  
Hypothesis 1:  The Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis holds true in the context of African 
regionalization2 
 
 
                         
2
 Baltagi et al. (2009) and Hahn (2010) have verified the Rajan and Zingales(2003) hypothesis on a broad range of 
developing countries. In limiting our investigation to regions in Africa and applying robust interaction (between trade 
openness and financial openness) variables (globalization indexes), we provide a more narrowed approach which 
could have more focused policy implications.    
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2.1.1 Financial globalization and financial sector development  
  
Financial globalization can obviously lead to the development of the financial sector. The 
presence of asymmetric information presents an important concern for lenders who do not always 
have an adequate knowledge of the project to be undertaken with borrowed funds. This could 
affect intermediation efficiency as deposits would not fully be exploited by banks. Financial 
globalization could enhance the functioning of the financial system by the provision of funds for 
investment opportunities as well as improvement of infrastructure that curtail information 
asymmetry. Therefore, financial globalization increases the availability of credit by reducing 
adverse selection and moral hazard. 
 Regarding how financial globalization could specifically affect financial intermediary 
efficiency, Shumkler(2004) supports the view of Claessens et al.(2001)  and  Peria et al.(2003) in 
asserting that competitive pressure created by foreign banks lead to improvement in banking 
system efficiency in the perspectives of lowering operating costs and smaller margins between 
lending and deposit interest. 
 
2.1.2 Trade globalization and financial section development. 
     
The financial success of China as an export driven economy in the aftermath of   her 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the beginning of the millennium presents strong 
evidence for trade account openness as a means to financial development.  
Much earlier in the literature, Dornbusch (1992) presented a case for trade liberalization 
for developing countries in which he pointed out the essence of regional trade agreements and 
service-trade liberalization in the effort to economic development. However, he stressed that trade 
restrictions should be lifted only in tandem with development. Therefore one may be poised to 
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assert that complete trade liberalization could not be instrumental to some underdeveloped 
countries; especially in the short-run. Conversely, in recent literature Kim et al. (2010) have used 
Pool Mean Group on eighty-eight countries with data spanning from 1960-2005 to find a positive 
long-run link between trade openness and financial development.  
Some studies have exclusively focused on the African continent. Mbabazi et al. (2008) use 
cross-section and panel econometric techniques to investigate the link between growth, inequality 
and openness in forty-four sub-Saharan African countries. Using data ranging from 1970 to 1995, 
they provide evidence of the existence of a positive association between openness and growth. 
Well before, Kandiero and Chitiga (2003) had probed into linkages between openness and FDI in 
the continent. Their findings revealed: for the economy in general and service sector in particular, 
per capita FDI responds well to increased openness. To put this finding in the context of our 
paper, in accordance with Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006), FDI represents financial openness. Thus 
one could paraphrase and revise their conclusion as: trade account openness cause capital account 
openness. The literature above inspires the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Globalization (finance and trade) in the post-regionalization era has improved 
African regional financial systems in their ability to allocate mobilized funds to investment 
opportunities3 
 
2.2 Related literature on regionalization in Africa 
 
 The case for economic and financial regionalization in Africa has been widely covered in 
the literature. Regional corporation (Irving, 2005) and regional integration (Okeahalam, 2001; 
                         
3
 In recent openness literature, financial development has been conceived with respect to variation in private domestic 
credit (Baltagi et al., 2009) or between private domestic credit and financial depth (Hahn, 2010).  Our indicator of 
finance shall combine both financial depth (aka financial deposits) and private domestic credit (aka financial credits). 
The choice of this new indicator is inspired by the continents surplus liquidity issues as well as the need to take stock 
of structural adjustment policy effects.  
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Irving, 2005; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Wakeman-Linn and Wagh, 2008 and Kumo, 2008) have 
been widely seen as the path to economic growth and development in the continent.  
 With respect to Irving (2005) who largely lends credit to Okeahalam (2001), a strong case 
for corporation and integration of stock markets in southern and eastern Africa would improve 
diversification of risks in a wider market, produce more efficient and competitive markets, procure 
higher returns and lower cost, as well as increase cross boarder capital flows. He further stresses, 
regionalization could boost liquidity and the capacity of markets to mobilize international and 
local capital for private sector and infrastructural development. This position is largely shared by 
Yartey and Adjasi (2007) in their work on critical issues and challenges for stock market 
development in Africa. A principal setback emphasized in the report is the presence of a core 
political challenge that still needs to be overcome. Indeed many still view stock markets as issues 
of national pride like Airline companies, which remains a great obstacle to regionalization. This 
political challenged is also outlined by Kumo (2008)4. 
  Wakeman-Linn and Wagh (2008) largely dedicate their work to the benefits of 
regionalization in financial sector development. Comparing their study with those earlier 
elucidated above on the type of regionalization that would most benefit African financial markets, 
one important hypothesis draws our attention. 
Hypothesis 3: The type of regionalization (economic, monetary or both) affects the quality of 
financial intermediation efficiency5   
 
                         
4
 With respect to Kumo(2008), the main challenges to stock market development are: political instability in some 
economies, high volatility in economic growth, , liquidity constraints,   macroeconomic uncertainty, limited domestic 
investor base, underdeveloped trading and settlement structures and limited market information. 
5
 As far as our perusal of the literature is concern, to the best of our knowledge, we have not found a study that 
compares how the type of regionalization could affect financial development (aka financial efficiency). In other 
words, How does the concept of surplus liquidity differ across regions in the African banking sector. As per our 
conception and definition of efficiency, financial intermediary allocation efficiency and bank sector liquidity are 
mutually exclusive. The more efficient a bank is the less liquid it is.    
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2.3 Literature on measuring financial intermediary efficiency  
 
Hitherto, much research on the efficiency of banks has been based on Data Envelopment 
Analysis (hence DEA); which is a non parametric method in operations research applied to 
estimate the production efficiency of decision making units: production frontiers. Although this 
methodology has the advantage of not adopting a particular functional form (non parametric 
approach), it has the short coming of being unable to present a link between endogenous and 
exogenous variables (output and input). For instance Sathye (2002) uses the DEA method to 
measure differing efficiency of Indian banks across sectors. Findings based on data from 1997-
1998 reveal the mean efficiency score of Indian banks and that of world banks are comparable. 
More specifically, the efficiency of the private sector commercial banks as a group is found to be 
lower than those of foreign and public banks. While this work could have the advantage of 
presenting a case for the privatization of commercial banks, its policy implication has the 
shortcoming of being purely qualitative. Much recently, Staub et al. (2010) have used DEA to 
probe into the technical and allocation efficiency of Brazilian firms from 2000-2007. Findings 
show that compared to banks in Europe and the USA, Brazilian banks have lower levels of 
efficiency. More so, compared to banks with foreign, private-domestic and private with foreign 
participation, banks owned by the state are more cost efficient. This later study on DEA yet 
reveals that the concept of bank efficiency is cost oriented. Beside the use of DEA, recent studies 
based on other methodologies dedicated to the efficiency of banks in Africa have been tilted 
toward the cost/profit oriented concepts of efficiency (Kiyota, 2009; Kablan, 2010).   
 Borrowing from Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck (2009) there are four main indicators    of 
financial intermediary efficiency in the literature: 
-ratio of bank credit to bank deposits that appreciates the extent to which savings can fund loans; 
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-overhead cost representing the accounting value of a banks overhead cost as a share of its total 
assets; 
-cost/income ratio, that accounts for overhead cost in relation to gross revenues; and 
-‘net interest margin’: which indicates the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenues as a 
share of total earnings assets. 
 While the last three indicators are profitability-oriented, our conception of efficiency in 
this paper is best defined by the first measure. This reflects evaluating how “private sector credit” 
is financed by “deposits”. The existence of a high loan-deposit ratio is therefore synonymous to 
high intermediation efficiency and vice-versa.  
 Our study will be unique in the following ways: (1) usage of efficiency indicators that are 
compatible with the fundamental financial intermediary role and present banking liquidity issues 
in Africa6; (2) investigate the role regionalization has played on financial intermediary efficiency 
in the face of globalization; (3) control for how welfare has influenced financial development in 
the sub-regions; (4) verify the Rajan and Zingales(2003) hypothesis from regional perspectives 
and exclusively in Africa; (5) assess if banking system efficiency is robust to financial system 
efficiency.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Globalization data 
 As summarized in table 1, in this study we defined globalization as a combination of 
trade and capital account openness. While Financial Openness (F.O) is proxied by Gross private 
                         
6
 The financial intermediary role is to convert deposits into credit; not profit making. African banks are suffering from 
over liquidity. We differ from  mainstream studies that appreciate efficiency from  cost and profit perspectives(Kiyota, 
2009;Kablan,2010)   
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capital flows on GDP and Gross foreign direct investment on GDP, Trade Openness (T.O) is 
assimilated to per capita Imports and per capita Exports. In a bid to ensure robustness of results we 
further use variables that combine the effects of F.O indicators (financial openness index) and T.O 
proxies (Import plus Exports on GDP); as well as a globalization index (interaction of T.O and 
F.O). All flow variables are in current US dollar terms. 
Table 1: Openness data 
 
Variables 
Globalization(Openness) 
Financial  Openness(F.O) Trade Openness(T.O) 
GPCFgdp GFDIgdp Finopex Igdp Xgdp Tropex 
 
 
Definitions 
Gross 
Private 
Capital 
Flows on 
GDP 
Gross 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
on GDP 
Financial 
Openness 
Index 
Imports 
on GDP 
Exports 
on GDP 
Imports plus 
Exports on 
GDP 
Sources  ADI ADI PCA ADI ADI ADI 
Usages in 
Openness 
literature 
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006),Baltagi et al. (2009), 
Hanh(2010) 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
 
Standard Proxies  
Hanh(2010), 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
 
 
Variables  
          Principal Financial Development Indicators(Main Model) 
Depth Efficiency Size Activity DESA-1 
llgdp bcbd dbacba prdcgdp Findex1 
 
Definition 
Liquid liability 
on GDP 
Bank Credit 
on Bank 
Deposits 
Deposit bank 
assets on Total 
financial  
assets  
Private credit 
by domestic 
banks on 
GDP 
Financial 
development 
Index1 
Sources FDSD FDSD FDSD FDSD PCA 
Usages in 
Financial 
development 
literature 
Hanh(2010), 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1999), 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Beck (2009) 
Baltagi et al. 
(2009),  
Hanh(2010) 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
 
 
Variables 
Robustness tests financial development Indicators 
Depth Efficiency Size Activity DESA-2 
fdgdp prdcfsd 
        ? prdcofgdp Findex 2 
Definition Financial 
system 
deposits on 
GDP 
Private 
domestic 
credit on 
financial 
system 
deposit 
 Private credit 
from 
domestic 
banks and 
other 
financial 
institutions 
Financial 
development 
index 
Sources FDSD FDSD 
        ? FDSD PCA 
Usages in 
literature/ 
justification 
Authors 
correlation 
analysis 
Authors 
correlation 
analysis 
        ? Authors 
correlation 
analysis 
Gries et al. 
(2009) 
ADI: African Development Indicators.   PCA: Principal Component   Analysis.  FDSD: Financial 
 Development and Structure Database. 
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3.1.2 Financial Intermediary Development (FID) data 
 Referring to table 1, there are many indicators of F.I.D that could be clubbed into four 
main categories based on conceptual and correlation criteria7. In this study, we identify the 
following: 
-financial depth proxied by liquid liabilities on GDP or per capita financial system deposits; 
-financial efficiency, expressed by bank credit on bank deposits or financial system credit on 
financial system deposits;  
-financial size represented by deposit banks assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets; 
-financial activity explained by private credit from domestic banks as well as private credit from 
domestic banks and other financial institutions.  
 All flow variables are in current US dollar terms. Due to the specific nature of our 
research hypotheses we shall adopt only the concept of efficiency8 as the measure of financial 
development.  
 
3.1.3 Control and robustness tests variables  
 
 We control for the growth-led-finance nexus using two distinct but highly correlated 
variables. While “Gross domestic product per capita growth rate” is used on the main model, 
“Gross domestic product growth rate” is used for robustness checks. In the same vein “Private 
domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions on financial system deposit” 
which proxies’ financial-system-efficiency will robustly check banking-system-efficiency 
(proxied by “private domestic credit from deposit banks on bank deposits”)  
                         
7
 First of all, ten main indicators of financial intermediary development are classified into four conceptual categories. 
Then correlation analysis is used to test if data structure reflects conceptual assumptions. Lastly, the choice of a proxy 
in each category is based on usages in literature.  
8
 The three other indicators are either broad or too narrow with respect to understanding how regionalization has 
improved allocation efficiency in Africa. For instance, while the concept of financial depth is largely correlated with 
the liability (deposit) side of a bank’s balance sheet, financial activity is mostly sensitive to asset side (credit). 
Meanwhile, the ratio of credit by domestic banks to total credit which explains financial size is too broad here.  
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3.1.4 Regionalization data 
 
 There are eleven main economic and/or monetary regions in Africa (Appendix 1): 
  
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
 
-West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); 
 
-Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); 
 
-Economic and Monetary Authority of Central Africa (CEMAC); 
 
-Franc Zone (CEMAC plus UEMOA countries); 
 
-South African Development Community (SADC);  
 
-East African Community (EAC); 
 
-South African Customs Union (SACU); 
 
-Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA); 
 
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); 
 
- Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) 
 
 
 ECOWAS, The Franc Zone, SADC, SACU, IGAD and UMA regions are not retained 
for our study because with respect to their creation dates, data was either unavailable or very 
limited for the application of a policy-time-dummy estimation technique. For the remaining 
economic and/or monetary unions we were further constrained by unavailability of data to narrow 
down the number of counties (see Appendix 2) in the database to the following: 
-for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and 
Senegal are retained; 
-Cameroon, Gabon and Congo Republic for the CEMAC zone; 
-Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda make up the EAC; and 
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-within the framework of COMESA, Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia are retained; 
 In the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Burundi, Cameroon, Congo 
Republic, Gabon and Rwanda are selected. However after analysis, we are unable to test for robustness 
because the financial-efficiency indicator used to check results of the bank- efficiency proxy has a different 
degree of integration9.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Correlation and Principal Component Analyses (PCA)  
 
Table 2:  Derivation of Indexes (Financial Openness and Globalization indexes)  
Principal 
Indicator 
Indexes Cor. coef. 
(t-stats) 
Eigen 
Value 
First PC 
variation 
Component  Matrix 
UEMOA 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.898***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(23.53) 1.898 0.949 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.199**   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(2.34) 1.199 0.599 0.707 0.707 
COMESA 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.981***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(82.51) 1.981 0.990 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.250***   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(4.15) 1.250 0.625 0.707 0.707 
CEMAC 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.994***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(64.94) 1.994 0.997 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.360**   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(2.58) 1.360 0.680 0.707 0.707 
EAC 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.996***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(88.912) 1.996 0.998 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
-0.352***   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(-2.744) 1.352 0.676 -0.707 -0.707 
Globex: Globalization Index.  Finopex: Financial Openness Index.  FDIgdp and PCFgdp are capital account openness indicators. (I+X) gdp is the 
trade openness variable.  PC: Principal Component. Cor. Coef: Correlation coefficient. *, **, ***: are respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels.  
 
 As shown in table 2, the objective of PCA is to reduce the dimension of variables while 
retaining as much information as possible on initial variability. As opposed to recent openness 
                         
9
 From an empirical point of view, the high correlation (88%) between banking system efficiency and financial system 
efficiency for ECCAS is a necessary but insufficient condition for a robustness test application. Compatibility of 
integration orders in endogenous variables is also crucial for the purpose of robustness check.  
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literature where PCA is not empirically justified by correlation analyses (Gries et al., 2009), we 
provide evidence of significant correlations analyses (column 3) prior to PCA.  With respect to 
Kaiser 1 criterion (Kaiser, 1960), we stop at first principal components which represent our 
indexes. In the case of CEMAC for instance, the financial openness index which is a combination 
of FDIgdp and PCFgdp for the region retains about 99.7% of initial information. By the same 
token, the globalization index which is the combination of the derived financial openness index 
and trade openness indicator represents close to 68% of their initial variability.   
 
3.2.2 Cross Sectional Dependence tests 
 
 A cross sectional dependence test determines if a first generation (cross sectional 
independence) or second generation (cross sectional dependence) panel unit root test should be 
applied to investigate series stationary properties. However these tests are valid only and only if 
the numbers of cross-sections (N) in a panel are greater than the time series (T) interval in each 
cross-section. Characteristics of our panels are incompatible with recommendations for this test 
(T>N); implying only first generational tests are applicable.  
 
3.2.3 Panel Unit root tests (both homogenous and heterogeneous based tests)  
 
 Following Hanh (2010) we apply both homogenous and heterogeneous oriented first 
generational panel unit root tests. Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC-2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS-
2003) tests respectively for common unit roots and individual unit roots have been widely applied 
on macro economic variables in recent openness-finance literature(Hanh,2010). In selecting 
stationary properties of variables, we refer to both tests but base our decisions on IPS in case of 
conflict of interest.10 Borrowing from Khim (2004) optimal lags selection for LLC and IPS tests 
                         
10
 As pointed out by Maddala and Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of the LLC test (on the absence of a common 
unit root) is too strong.  
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are determined by Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) and Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) respectively11. Results are presented in table 3, with variables without unit roots (stationary) 
in bold.  
 
                         
11
 While the AIC and Final Prediction Error (FPE) best estimate lags when observations are more or less 60, the HQC 
best avoids the underestimation of lags when observations are about 120 and above. Suffice to mention, the LLC is 
based on pooled data.  The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) also known as the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) presents the short-coming of underestimating lags in the auto regression process.   
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  Table 3: Homogenous and heterogeneous panel unit root tests 
Z
on
es 
 
Vbles 
 
Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests  Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests 
Level First diff. Level First diff.  Level First diff. Level First diff. 
c ct c ct c ct c ct  c ct c ct c ct c ct 
 
 
 
U 
E 
M
O 
A 
FDIgdp -2.90***   -3.01*** n.a n.a -3.89*** -4.68*** n.a n.a  
 
C 
E 
M
A 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.78** -2.97*** n.a n.a -1.18 -1.16 -6.24*** -5.05*** 
PCFgdp -2.86*** -2.79*** n.a n.a -4.87*** -4.92*** n.a n.a -1.83** -2.92*** n.a n.a -0.73 -0.67 -5.09*** -3.29*** 
Finopex -1.90** -2.46*** n.a n.a -3.40*** -4.26*** n.a n.a -1.72** -3.10*** n.a n.a -0.91 -0.88 -5.62*** -4.40*** 
Igdp -1.55* -2.34*** n.a n.a -2.24** -1.60* n.a n.a -1.36* -1.87** n.a n.a -0.60 -0.83 -3.94*** -4.35*** 
Xgdp -2.42*** -3.03*** n.a n.a -1.57* -1.42* n.a n.a -0.32 0.86 -4.06*** -3.71*** 0.09 0.17 -4.38*** -3.26*** 
Tropex 2.05 1.53 -9.47*** -6.67*** 0.96 1.74 -7.03*** -5.67*** 3.18 4.31 -1.43* -1.19 1.17 2.31 -2.31** -1.42* 
Globex -1.100 -0.720 -9.72*** -8.91*** -1.90** -1.40* n.a n.a -1.98** -3.32*** n.a n.a -0.78 -1.35* -5.99*** -4.66*** 
GDPg -8.52*** -6.84*** n.a n.a -7.20*** -6.18*** n.a n.a -3.52*** -1.82** n.a n.a -3.66*** -2.16** n.a n.a 
GDPpcg -6.70*** -6.89*** n.a n.a -6.94*** -6.12*** n.a n.a -3.45*** -1.77** n.a n.a -3.61*** -2.05** n.a n.a 
bcbd -5.76*** -6.22*** n.a n.a -6.49*** -4.67*** n.a n.a -1.37* 3.37 n.a n.a -1.46* -0.82 n.a n.a 
prdcfsd -2.02** 0.18 n.a n.a -0.55 0.63 n.a n.a -3.25*** -5.63*** n.a n.a -2.37*** -4.79*** n.a n.a 
 
 
 
C 
O
M 
E 
S 
A 
 
FDIgdp -1.04 -2.90** 21.58 -4.38*** -2.97*** -4.10*** n.a n.a  
 
 
 
E 
A 
C 
-1.58* -1.58* n.a n.a -1.40* -0.77 -4.43*** -3.12*** 
PCFgdp -1.87** -3.54*** n.a n.a -3.15*** -4.60*** n.a n.a -1.54* -2.16** n.a n.a -1.11 -0.93 -5.14*** -3.85*** 
Finopex -1.41* -3.18*** n.a n.a -3.04*** -3.97*** n.a n.a -1.63* -2.53*** n.a n.a -4.46*** -3.08*** n.a n.a 
Igdp -1.09 -3.04*** -12.0*** -9.78*** -1.32* -2.92*** n.a n.a 2.05 0.06 -4.17*** -2.90*** 2.13 0.19 -4.45*** -3.61*** 
Xgdp -2.03** -3.52*** n.a n.a -3.14*** -3.45*** n.a n.a -0.12 -0.55 -5.13*** -5.17*** -0.66 -1.55* -5.38*** -4.95*** 
Tropex -0.79 -5.29*** -9.16*** -4.91*** -2.59*** -4.96*** n.a n.a 2.45 -0.30 -4.32*** -2.64*** 2.06 -0.95 -5.06*** -4.37*** 
Globex 2.21 8.66 27.08 -6.45*** -1.89** -4.33*** n.a n.a -1.02 -1.58* -3.05*** -2.39*** -0.59 -1.45* -3.48*** -2.09** 
GDPg -9.62*** -8.63*** n.a n.a -9.17*** -9.30*** n.a n.a -1.61* -1.71** n.a n.a -1.45* -2.57*** n.a n.a 
GDPpcg -8.61*** -6.25*** n.a n.a -8.98*** -9.40*** n.a n.a -1.49* -4.49*** n.a n.a -1.25 -3.95*** -7.09*** -5.48*** 
bcbd -8.48*** -6.05*** n.a n.a -8.98*** -9.36*** n.a n.a -2.58*** -0.10 n.a n.a -2.18** 1.85 n.a n.a 
prdcfsd -2.88*** 4.76 n.a n.a -2.61*** -0.90 n.a n.a -3.17*** -1.75** n.a n.a -2.51*** 0.15 n.a n.a 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Optimal lag selection is governed by AIC and H&Q for IPS and LLC tests respectively. Maximum lags applied are based on time series length: with 3 for ‘UEMOA and 
COMESA’ and 2 for ‘CEMAC, ECCAS and EAC’.  7 lags are applied on ‘ prdcfsd’ for COMESA . ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively. n.a: not applicable. Stationary series are in bold and decision rule 
depends on both tests but priority is given the IPS in case of conflict of interest. LLC; Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). First diff: First difference. Vbles: variables.   
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3.2.4 Model specification tests (Goodness of fit tests)  
 We have earlier emphasized our objective of investigating post-regionalization policy effects. 
This requires the application of policy-time dummies which is by definition a fixed effect regression. 
Therefore, the Hausman test which aims to specify whether a random-effect or fixed-effect model 
should be applied is not deserving of examination within our context. To add more flesh to the bone, 
Dummy or Fixed-effect (FE) regressions have the added advantage of not hypothetically assuming 
that explanatory variables are not correlated with residuals. Beyond this truism, the use of FE 
accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity between countries in the region. More generally, in the 
literature when a panel consist of observations on a fixed and relatively small sets of interest units 
(say member states of a given region), there is a presumption in favor of FE. Pragmatically speaking, 
we verified the application of a random effect model and found that, this could not be possible due to 
insufficient degrees of freedom.  
 On whether Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with FE or Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with 
FE should be applied, we opt for the later and justify our choice after regression by testing for the 
significance of heteroskedasticity.   
 
3.2.5 Model formulation 
 
Based on results from correlation analyses12 presented in Appendix 3, we derived the 
following binary dummy models for banking intermediary efficiency (BcBd): 
 
++= itit IBcBd 10 γγ +itita IA1γ itPCF2γ +itita PCFA2γ +itGDPpcg3γ +itita GDPpcgA3γ itε
     (1)               
 
++= itit XBcBd 10 γγ +itita XA1γ +itFDI2γ +tiita FDIA2γ +itGDPpcg3γ +itita GDPpcgA3γ itε
  (2)           
 
                         
12
 Correlation analyses helps to avoid problems linked to overparametization and multicolinearity. 
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++= itit TropexBcBd 10 γγ +itita TropexA1γ +itFinopex2γ +tiita FinopexA2γ +itGDPpcg3γ +itita GDPpcgA3γ
 
itε
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                            (3) 
++= itit GlobexBcBd 10 γγ +itita GlobexA1γ +itGDPpcg2γ +itita GDPpcgA2γ itε
                            (4)                      
 
The robustness of models (1), (2), (3) and (4) will be checked with models (1*), (2*), (3*) and 
(4*) which have different dependent and control variables. While the first sets of equations appreciate 
banking intermediary system efficiency, the later verify financial intermediary system efficiency.  
++= itit Iprdcfsd 10 γγ +itita IA1γ +itPCF2γ +itita PCFA2γ +itGDPg3γ +itita GDPgA3γ itε
        (1*)           
 
++= itit Xprdcfsd 10 γγ +itita XA1γ +itFDI2γ +tiita FDIA2γ +itGDPg3γ +itita GDPgA3γ itε
      (2*) 
 
++= itit Tropexprdcfsd 10 γγ +itita TropexA1γ +itFinopex2γ +tiita FinopexA2γ +itGDPg3γ +itita GDPgA3γ itε
         
                                                                                                                                                           (3*) 
++= itit Globexprdcfsd 10 γγ +itita GlobexA1γ +itGDPg2γ +itita GDPgA2γ itε
                              (4*) 
Where:  
- Countries pi ,...,2,1= ; time nt ,...,2,1=  
-for Effect Before Policy;
 
0=itA  
-for Effect After Policy; 1=itA  
-X, I, Tropex FDI, PCF, Finopex and Globex are all on GDP. 
 For ease in interpretation of estimators upon regression, parameters of the models in 
estimated form are represented as in tables 4 and 5 as follows:  
-constant, Igdp, aIgdp, PCFgdp, aPCFgdp, GDPpcg, aGDPpcg (Model 1)  
-constant, Xgdp, aXgdp, FDIgdp, aFDIgdp,GDPpcg, aGDPpcg (Model 2);  
-constant, Tropexgdp, aTropexgdp, FDIgdp, aFDIgdp, GDPpcg, aGDPpcg (Model 3); 
-constant, Globex, aGlobex, GDPpcg, aGDPpcg (Model 4);  
-constant, Igdp, aIgdp, PCFgdp, aPCFgdp, GDPpcg, aGDPg (Model 1*);  
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-constant, Xgdp, aXgdp, FDIgdp, aFDIgdp,GDPpcg, aGDPg (Model 2*);  
-constant, Tropexgdp, aTropexgdp, FDIgdp, aFDIgdp, GDPpcg, aGDPg (Model 3*); 
-constant, Globex, aGlobex, GDPg, aGDPg (Model 4*)  
Where: ‘a’ is estimated parameter for the regionalization implication.  
  
 
3.2.6 Empirical analyses and Robustness tests  
 
Models 1 to 4 which appreciate banking system efficiency shall be replicated to all regions 
under consideration. Robustness check for financial system efficiency is ensured by models 1* to 4*. 
Results are presented in tables 4 and 5.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 A general look at tested hypotheses  
 
 
Hypothesis 113: Like Baltagi et al. (2009) and very recently Hanh (2010), results presented in tables 4 
and 5 suggest that trade openness and financial openness are independent significant determinants of 
bank sector efficiency or inefficiency; though regions could more or less benefit by simultaneously 
opening their trade and capital accounts. Therefore our findings provide only partial support for the 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis, which stipulates that both types of openness are imperative to 
account for financial development.  
 Another relevant discovery which is analogous to the hypothesis above is the fact that bank 
efficiency is more sensitive to financial account openness than it is to trade account openness (see 
UEMOA and CEMAC results).  
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 The Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis holds true in the context of African regionalization. 
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Hypothesis 214 
  
 While for UEMOA and CEMAC, globalization has decreased the ability of the banking 
system to provide funds for investment projects, COMESA has experienced the opposite; albeit, with 
negative effects from financial openness and trade openness. EAC results are insignificant. With the 
partial exception of COMESA, regionalization for the most part has not been instrumental to 
financial intermediary efficiency over the past decade. UEMOA is the region with the highest surplus 
liquidity, followed by CEMAC. COMESA on the other hand is less affected by issues related to 
over-liquidity.  
 
Hypothesis 3 15 
 
 Our results reveal ‘economic and monetary’ regions have more surplus liquidity than purely 
economic regions. The impact of globalization has a more detrimental effect to ‘economic and 
monetary’ regions (UEMOA and CEMAC) than to purely economic regions (COMESA and EAC)16.  
   
 
4.2 Specific look at effects of regionalization and globalization 
 
 For UEMOA: (1) increase in exports and imports have independently decreased banking 
efficiency; (2) when the region is opened to exports and imports simultaneously, the effect on 
banking system inefficiency decreases; (3)while globalization has also degraded financial system 
efficiency, GDP growth has improved it.  
 In the context of CEMAC, financial openness, trade openness and globalization have been 
detrimental to improving the ability of bank deposits to finance economic operators.  
                         
14
 Globalization (finance and trade) in the post regionalization era has improved African regional financial systems in 
their ability to allocate mobilized funds to investment opportunities. 
15
 The type of regionalization (economic, monetary or both) affects the quality of intermediation efficiency. 
16
 Should we increase the significance level for EAC, the sign-effect of the globalization parameter would satisfy this 
inference.  
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           Looking at COMESA, we find more appealing results in the perspective that financial 
openness and globalization have improved banking efficiency. Improvement of welfare (GDP per 
capita growth) in the region has also led to an increase in bank credit with respect to bank deposits.  
 Results are insignificant for the East African Community (EAC).   
 While for UEMOA GDP growth has increased financial system efficiency, in COMESA GDP 
per capita growth has increased banking system efficiency. We could therefore infer a positive 
growth-led-finance nexus for these two regions.  
 
4.3 Discussion of results 
 
 General results seem to posit that with regionalization in the face of globalization, 
African banking and/or financial systems have faced much competition from foreign banks. This is 
logical from common sense and to some extends competitive advantage theory which suggests that 
developed economies seem to have a relative advantage in the service (banking) sector. Therefore, 
openness oriented activities and projects are for the most part funded by foreign banks, not domestic 
ones. On a negative note, one could infer that contrary to assertions of Shumkler (2004), Claessens et 
al. (2001) and Peria et al. (2003), regionalization has not increased banking competitive pressures to 
the benefit of regional banks. Regionalization from a financial view-point has increased the presence 
of asymmetric information which remains an important concern for lenders(banks) who might not 
always have a good knowledge of what exactly economic operators intent to do with borrowed funds, 
especially if the project/activity is to be implemented without(across) national borders. This has 
greatly affected intermediation efficiency as savings are not fully exploited by financial institutions.  
 The presence of a positive growth-led-finance nexus in our findings is not unexpected. This 
stems from the fact that with increase in welfare, economic agents turn to rely more on credit for their 
activities.  
 22
 As a policy implication, national and regional authorities should gain knowledge of the fact 
that in the face of globalization, the role of domestic and regional banks turn to lessen in the 
financing of openness related activities and projects. Much needs to be done on the improvement of 
infrastructure that curtails information asymmetry in the banking industry.   
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Table 4: Regressions results for UEMOA and CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Regions) 
Regions UEMOA CEMAC 
Estimated 
Parameters 
Main Models (Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests (Financial System Efficiency) Main Models (Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests(Financial System Efficiency) 
Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* 
Constant 0.945*** 1.106*** 1.52*** 1.23*** 0.632*** 0.544*** 1.51*** 1.36*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.78*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 0.86*** 
 (3.947) (4.508) (25.01) (22.73) (4.328) (4.100) (30.40) (29.41) (16.09) (17.08) (17.84) (20.37) (14.57) (14.21) (14.98) (17.90) 
FDIgdp --- -0.025 --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- 
  (-0.559)    (0.298)    (1.324)    (0.801)   
a FDIgdp --- 0.025 --- --- --- 0.023 --- --- --- -0.023** --- --- --- -0.015* --- --- 
 
 (0.385)    (0.580)    (-2.528)    (-1.759)   
PCFgdp -0.029 --- --- --- -0.008 --- --- --- 0.017* --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- 
 (-0.698)    (-0.242)    (1.990)    (1.420)    
aPCFgdp 0.059 --- --- --- 0.042 --- --- --- -0,02*** --- --- --- -0.022** --- --- --- 
 
(1.036)    (1.046)    (-2.732)    (-2.489)    
Finop --- --- -0.041 --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- 0.079* --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
   (-0.895)    (0.216)    (1.945)    (0.894)  
aFinop --- --- 0.093 --- --- --- 0.049 --- --- --- -0.15*** --- --- --- -0.113** --- 
 
  (1.483)    (0.939)    (-3.338)    (-2.412)  
Igdp 0.020*** --- --- --- 0.029*** --- --- --- -0.006 --- --- --- -0.012* --- --- --- 
 (2.83)    (6.350)    (-0.888)    (-1.823)    
aIgdp -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.004* --- --- --- -0.006** --- --- --- 
 (-8.41)    (-11.85)    -1.748    (-2.380)    
Xgdp --- 0.021* --- --- --- 0.040*** --- --- --- -0.009 --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- 
  (1.943)    (7.380)    (-1.263)    (0.187)   
aXgdp --- -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.03*** --- --- --- -0.001* --- --- --- -0.004** --- --- 
 
 (-6.557)    (-13.69)    (-1.802)    (-2.456)   
Tropex --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 0.006* --- --- --- -0.014** --- --- --- -0.01* --- 
   (0.764)    (1.855)    (-2.359)    (-1.699)  
aTropex --- --- -0.01*** --- --- --- -0.01*** --- --- --- -0.002*** --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
 
  (-8.040)    (-9.37)    (-3.542)    (-3.125)  
Globex --- --- --- -0.147 --- --- --- 0.18** --- --- --- 0.089 --- --- --- -0.000 
    (-1.504)    (2.244)    (1.093)    (-0.008) 
aGlobex --- --- --- (-0.032) --- --- --- -0.27*** --- --- --- -0.164** ---   -0.096 
 
   0.027    (-3.034)    (-2.438)  --- --- (-1.230)  
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.02*** -0.016** -0.017** -0.013 --- --- --- --- -0.037** -0.042** -0.040*** -0.022 
     (-3.081) (-2.528) (-1.983) (-1.202)     (-2.532) (-2.716) (-2,749) (-1.567) 
aGDPg --- --- --- --- 0.032** 0.018* 0.020 -0.05*** --- --- --- --- 0.013 0.015 0.014 --- 
 
    (2.599) (1.664) (1.503) (-3.24)     (0.678) (0.762) (0.719)  
GDPpcg -0.03*** -0.027** -0.021* -0.05*** --- --- --- --- -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.028* --- --- --- --- 
 (-2.75) (-2.36) (-1.893) (-3.97)     (-1.261) (-1.439) (-1.471) (-1.714)     
aGDPpcg 0.034 0.014 0.021 0.027 --- --- --- --- -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 --- --- --- --- 
 
(1.49) (0,592) (0.980) (0.960)     (-0.738) (-0.783) (-0.763) (-0.414)     
R² ajust. 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.19 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.45 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.14 
F-Stats 14.87*** 12.08*** 12.72*** 5.11*** 39.63*** 48.01*** 27.13*** 13.29*** 2.96** 3.25*** 4.21*** 2.32* 3.55*** 3.01** 3.68*** 2.17* 
*, **, *** denote respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Estimated parameters with ‘a’ represent after policy implications to banking and financial system efficiencies. UEMOA: West African Economic and 
Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Authority.  
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Table 5: Regression results for COMESA and EAC (Economic regions) 
Regions COMESA EAC 
Estimated 
Parameters 
Main Models(Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests (Financial System Efficiency) Main Models(Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests(Financial System Efficiency) 
Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* Model1 Model2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* 
Constant 0.89*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.70*** 1.02*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.76*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.61*** 0.67*** 
 (12.45) (12.95) (10.80) (49.61) (15.30) (15.02) (12.68) (41.88) (24.68) (24.29) (24.88) (25.50) (14.13) (13.78) (14.31) (14.54) 
FDIgdp --- -0.015 --- --- --- -0.015 --- --- --- -0.007 --- --- --- -0.003 --- --- 
  (-1.049)    (-1.094)    (-0.430)    (-0.20)   
a FDIgdp --- 0.013 --- --- --- 0.021 --- --- --- -0.023 --- --- --- -0.006 --- --- 
 
 (0.865)    (1.378)    (-0.912)    (-0.193)   
PCFgdp -0.026** --- --- --- -0.027** --- --- --- -0.004 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 
 (-2.00)    (-2.232)    (-0.245)    (-0.008)    
aPCFgdp 0.028* --- --- --- 0.035** --- --- --- -0.018 --- --- --- -0.009 --- --- --- 
 (1.909)    (2.57)    (-0.756)    (-0.318)    
Finop --- --- -0.05*** --- --- --- -0.05*** --- --- --- -0.08*** --- --- --- -0.08*** --- 
   (-2.684)    (-3.101)    (-4,189)    (-4.438)  
aFinop --- --- 0.064*** --- --- --- 0.08*** --- --- --- 0.047 --- --- -- 0.056 --- 
 
  (2.868)    (3.925)    (1.325)    (1.510)  
Igdp -0.003* --- --- --- -0.005*** --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- --- 
 (-1.759)    (-2.716)    (1.152)    (1.251)    
aIgdp -0.001** --- --- --- -0.002*** ---  --- -0.000 --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- 
 (-2.586)    (-2.837)    (-0.255)    (-0.412)    
Xgdp --- -0.004* --- --- --- -0.005** --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- 
  (-1.703)    (-2.048)    (0.248)    (0.796)   
aXgdp --- -0.001 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- 
 
 (-1.012)    (-0.544)    (0.094)    (-0.176)   
Tropex --- --- -0.001 --- ---  -0.002** --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 0.000 --- 
   (-1.619)    (-2.056)    (-0.279)    (0.203)  
aTropex --- --- -0.000 --- ---  -0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- 
 
  (-1.565)    (-1.164)    (-0.226)    (-0.384)  
Globex --- --- --- -0.08*** ---   -0.08*** --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- -0.002 
    (-3.319)    (-3.608)    (0.108)    (-0.064) 
aGlobex --- --- ---- 0.06*** ---   0.10*** --- --- --- 1.544 --- --- --- 0.011 
 
   (2.773)    (4.239)    (0.000)    (0.357) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 8,10 --- --- --- --- -0.018* -0.017 -0.007 -0.017 
     (-1.642) (-0.874) (-1.082) (0.021)     (-1.751) (-1.613) (-0.769) (-1.679) 
aGDPg --- --- --- --- 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008* --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.003 
 
    (0.416) (-1.186) (-0.304) (-1.809)     (0.207) (0.021) (0.271) (-0.508) 
GDPpcg -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.008* --- --- --- --- -0.014 -0.016 -0.001 -0.013 --- --- --- --- 
 (-2.805) (-2.735) (-2.601) (-1.917)     (-1.386) (-1.526) (-0.113) (-1.278)     
aGDPpcg 0.01*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.008 --- --- --- --- 0.017 0.021 0.010 0.003 --- --- --- --- 
 (2.602) (2.104) (2.255) (1.451)     (0.643) (0.789) (0.470) (0.267)     
R² ajust. 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.68 0.54 
F-Stats 15.70*** 14.28*** 15.31*** 16.86*** 31.24*** 25.72*** 27.60*** 31.10*** 7.41*** 7.03*** 11.56*** 8.86*** 9.03*** 8.62*** 14.68*** 11.36*** 
*, **, *** denote respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Estimated parameters with ‘a’ represent after policy implications to banking and financial system efficiencies.  COMESA: Common Markets for 
Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community.
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5. Conclusion  
 
 In this study, we have assessed post-regionalization benefits/ills of globalization in 
Africa with respect to financial intermediary efficiency. Results which are robust to financial 
system efficiency and growth-led-finance nexus reveal: (1) UEMOA and CEMAC regional 
banks’ ability to finance credit by deposits has reduced; (2) financial institutions of COMESA 
have improved their capacity to fund openness related activities/projects with deposits; (3) 
increase in welfare has positively affected the intermediary allocation role of banks in UEMOA 
and COMESA; (4) globalization tends to be more detrimental to financial systems of ‘economic 
and monetary’ regions than to those of purely economic regions. As a policy implication, 
national and regional authorities should gain knowledge of the fact that with globalization, the 
roles of domestic and regional banks appear to lessen in the funding of openness related 
activities and projects. Much needs to be done in the improvement of infrastructure that curtails 
information asymmetry in the banking industry. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Presentation of regions with corresponding balanced panels 
Regions Definition (Number of member 
states) 
Constituent countries(Founding date) Panel/ 
Dummy  
ECOWAS 
(CDEAO) 
Economic Community of West 
African States. (15) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde(1976), Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone , Togo,  
Mauritania(2000).  (5/1975)                                                                        
 
N/A 
 
UEMOA 
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union(8)           
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau 
(5/1997) °, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. (1/1994) 
(80-08) 
/(94-08) 
ECCAS 
(UDEAC)* 
Economic Community of 
Central African States(11) 
Angola(1999)°, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, D.R.Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe.( 1985) 
(90-08)/ 
(99-08) 
 
CEMAC 
Economic and Monetary 
Authority of Central Africa(6) 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. (1999) 
(90-08)/ 
(99-08) 
 
Franc 
ZONE 
 
CEMAC plus UEMOA (14) 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo(9/1939) 
 
N/A 
 
SADC 
 
South  African Development 
Community (15) 
Angola, Botswana, D.R Congo(1997)°, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius(1995)°, Mozambique, Namibia (1990)°, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa(1990)°, Seychelles(2004-2007°) and 
Madagascar(2005)° (1980) 
 
 
N/A 
SACU  South Africa Customs Union( 4) South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. (1970) N/A 
EAC  East African Community (5) Burundi (2007), Kenya, Rwanda (2007), Tanzania and 
Uganda. (2001) 
(90-08)/ 
(02-08) 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (19) 
Burundi, Comoros, D.R Congo, Djibouti, Egypt(1999)°, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya(2006)°, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles(2001)°, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.(1994)   
 
(80-08) 
/(95-08) 
IGAD Intergovernmental  Authority on 
Development (7) 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea (1993)°, Kenya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda. (1986) 
N/A 
UMA  Arab Maghreb  Union (5) Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania (1989) N/A 
Countries with dates in brackets are non-founding members. Countries in Italics have withdrawn their membership. °: countries not considered for panel 
because they entered the region very late or withdrew over time. N/A; denotes the region cannot be include in the study because creation date renders 
data incompatible with application of a policy-time dummy technique.* Founded in 1985 but became effective only by 1999.    
Appendix 2:  Selected regions and countries  
Regions Selected countries  Panel Dummy 
UEMOA Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal 1980-08 1994-08 
COMESA Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia 
1980-08 1995-08 
CEMAC Cameron, Gabon, Congo Republic 1990-08 1999-08 
ECCAS Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Rwanda 1990-08 1999-08 
EAC Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 1990-08 2002-08 
UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Authority. COMESA: Common Markets 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community. We dropped ECCAS because of incompatibility of robustness test.  
 27
    Appendix 3: Correlation Analyses 
UEMOA CEMAC 
FDI PCF X I F.O Glob Trop GDP GDPpc bcbd pdcd  FDI PCF X I F.O Glob Trop GDP GDPpc bcbd pdcd  
1.00 0.89 0.21 0.17 0.97 0.80 0.18 0.17 0.18 -0.25 -0.23 FDI 1.00 0.99 0.34 0.34 0.99 0.81 0.35 -0.02 0.03 -0.23 -0.28 FDI 
 1.00 0.20 0.16 0.97 0.79 0.18 0.14 0.15 -0.20 -0.18 PCF  1.00 0.35 0.34 0.99 0.82 0.36 -0.00 0.05 -0.25 -0.30 PCF 
  1.00 0.47 0.21 0.65 0.90 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.34 X   1.00 0.79 0.35 0.80 0.96 0.12 0.16 -0.16 -0.29 X 
   1.00 0.17 0.55 0.79 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.21 I    1.00 0.34 0.78 0.92 0.00 0.03 0.09 -0.04 I 
    1.00 0.81 0.19 0.16 0.17 -0.23 -0.21 F.O     1.00 0.82 0.36 -0.01 0.04 -0.24 -0.29 F.O 
     1.00 0.72 0.09 0.11 -.08 0.06 Glob      1.00 0.82 0.08 0.15 -0.22 -0.33 Glob 
      1.00 -0.09 -0.06 0.16 0.33 XI       1.00 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.09 XI 
       1.00 0.99 -0.36 -0.40 GDPg        1.00 0.99 -0.41 -0.46 GDPg 
        1.00 -0.36 -0.43 GDPpc         1.00 -0.43 -0.49 GDPpc 
         1.00 0.98 bcbd          1.00 0.92 bcbd 
          1.00 pdcd           1.00 pdcd 
                        
COMESA EAC 
FDI PCF X I F.O Glob Trop GDP GDPpc bcbd pdcd  FDI PCF X I F.O Glob Trop GDP GDPpc bcbd pdcd  
1.00 0.98 0.25 0.23 0.99 0.78 0.25 0.20 0.20 -0.25 -0.33 FDI 1.00 0.99 -0.25 -0.31 0.99 0.84 -0.34 0.55 0.56 -0.70 -0.73 FDI 
 1.00 0.25 0.23 0.99 0.77 0.25 0.21 0.20 -0.26 -0.34 PCF  1.00 -0.28 -0.31 0.99 0.84 -0.36 0.56 0.57 -0.70 -0.74 PCF 
  1.00 0.92 0.25 0.79 0.98 0.09 0.15 -0.03 -0.18 X   1.00 0.57 -0.2 -0.67 0.90 -0.42 -0.37 0.30 0.35 X 
   1.00 0.23 0.77 0.98 0.05 0.10 -0.00 -0.12 I    1.00 -0.3 -0.68 0.87 -0.40 -0.39 0.36 0.40 I 
    1.00 0.78 0.25 0.21 0.20 -0.25 -0.33 F.O     1.00 0.83 -0.35 0.56 0.57 -0.70 -0.74 F.O 
     1.00 0.79 0.19 0.23 -0.14 -0.27 Glob      1.00 -0.80 0.62 0.61 -0.62 -0.69 Glob 
      1.00 0.07 0.13 -0.02 -0.15 XI       1.00 -0.46 -0.44 0.25 0.33 XI 
       1.00 0.95 -0.14 -0.23 GDPg        1.00 0.99 -0.32 -0.43 GDPg 
        1.00 -0.13 -0.22 GDPpc         1.00 -0.33 -0.45 GDPpc 
         1.00 0.90 bcbd          1.00 0.97 bcbd 
          1.00 pdcd           1.00 pdcd 
                        
                        
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  PCF: Private Capital Flows. X: Exports. I: Imports. F.O: Financial Openness. Glob: Globalization.  Trop: Export and Imports. GDP: GDP growth. GDPpc: GDP per capita growth. 
bcbd: bank system efficiency. pdcd: financial system efficiency.  UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Authority. COMESA: Common 
Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community.                  
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